Brandon Wales
Acting Director
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, D.C. 20528

Dear Acting Director Wales:

As our nation grapples with the fallout of the cyber campaign against SolarWinds and other entities, we must remain focused on remediation, rebuilding, and prevention. Given the scope and severity of this campaign, it is imperative that our nation utilizes all the tools at its disposal to ensure that we fully expel adversaries from our networks, securely rebuild them, and prevent the future deployment of insecure Information and Communications Technology (ICT) in the future. As you know, these three goals are inextricably intertwined.

I remain concerned that the Federal Acquisition Security Council (FASC) is not making rapid enough progress to operationalize its ability to leverage its authorities from the SECURE Technology Act.

It is our understanding that CISA is currently developing the analytical framework that will help guide how risk judgements are considered by the FASC. As a member of the council and the designated information sharing agency of the FASC, it is incumbent on CISA to ensure that all recommendations take into account the wide range of potential attack vectors to the supply chain. Recent revelations about the cyber campaigns against SolarWinds and other entities have reinforced the foundational importance of secure software for overall ICT supply chain risk management. Accordingly, specific attention should be given to software assurance and software development lifecycle considerations as part of the analytic framework behind FASC recommendations.

Please detail CISA’s efforts to incorporate these critical aspects of software supply chain security into the FASC process, and an anticipated timeline for operationalizing this framework as soon as possible, but no later than February 1, 2021.

Sincerely,

JOHN KATKO
Ranking Member