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CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

THROUGH: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *Ronald G. Green*
VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF *R. J. ... 9/10/16*

FROM: Peter Levine, Deputy Chief Management Officer
Lt. Gen. Thomas Waldhauser, Joint Chiefs of Staff, J7

SUBJECT: Goldwater-Nichols Working Group Recommendations

In November 2015, you tasked us to coordinate a comprehensive review of Goldwater-Nichols legislation and related organizational issues in the DoD. You have asked us to report to you with final recommendations by no later than the end of March. To this end, we established a series of working groups to assess key issue areas.

The working groups have now presented their recommendations, which we have vetted with the senior leadership of the Department. The balance of this memorandum summarizes the recommendations of the working groups.

We intend to continue our review, with the objective of developing specific courses of action by the end of March. We will also continue to look for additional opportunities for efficiencies and other improvements in the Department's organization.

1. COMMAND & CONTROL; STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIPS

Actions Recommended:

- **Global Integration:** Strengthen the Chairman's capability to support the Secretary in management, planning, and execution across the Combatant Commands (COCOM). This would be achieved without placing the Chairman in the chain of command, through appropriate delegation of authority from the Secretary to the Chairman to prioritize military activities and resources across COCOM boundaries. The Department will submit legislative proposal clarifying the Secretary's discretionary authority to delegate such authority to the Chairman.
- **Strategy Development:** Strengthen the capability of the JS to contribute to strategy development to inform the development of operational plans and the identification of military alternatives to address contingencies, subject to policy guidance and review by

the civilian leadership. Improved capabilities should be focused on trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional threats, and multiple threats with overlapping timeframes.

- **Streamlined Staffing for Regional and Functional Matters:** Review and streamline the organization of DoD “communities of interest” that address regional or functional topics in OSD, Joint Staff (JS), Services, COCOMs, and DoD Agencies, to bring together multiple staffs addressing closely-related issues, reduce duplication of functions, and better align roles, responsibilities, and relationships across the Department.
- **Improved Vertical Integration of Staffs:** Analyze the staffing of functions such as logistics, intelligence and plans in the Joint Staff, the COCOMs, and subordinate commands for potential redundancies and opportunities for savings. This would specifically include consideration of “skipping an echelon” in functional alignment, where that can be done without loss of capability.
- **Improved Strategic Guidance Documents:** Review the Department’s strategic guidance documents and the processes for developing them, with goals of providing greater clarity and cohesion, minimizing complexity, and reducing offices that exist to write and staff these documents that are often overlapping and sometimes contradictory. For example, we will reconsider of the Defense Strategy Review (formerly known as the Quadrennial Defense Review) the extensive processes used to develop it, most of which duplicate existing strategic planning activities.

Actions Not Recommended:

- **Establishment of a General Staff.** The working groups concluded that a General Staff would quickly become a new bureaucracy that is removed from the needs of our fighting forces and less responsive to those needs than the JS. This view was supported by virtually all of the current and former DoD leaders interviewed by the review team.
- **Inclusion of the Chairman in the Chain of Command.** Placing the Chairman in the chain of command would undermine the principle of civilian control over the military and reduce the Chairman’s ability to provide independent military advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense. The working groups concluded that the capabilities of the Chairman and the JS could be appropriately enhanced without taking this step.
- **Elimination of COCOM role in Warfighting in Favor of Joint Task Forces.** The regional combatant commands build strategic relationships with foreign leaders (military and civilian), foster trust, and assure access across their areas of responsibility in a manner that is essential to projecting military power and furthering our policy objectives around the globe. No Joint Task Force could perform its operational mission without the personnel, planning, logistical, and communications support provided by the Combatant Commands.

2. JOINT DUTY REQUIREMENTS

Actions Recommended:

- Revise the statutory definition of “joint matters” to broaden the number and type of billets for which an officer may receive joint credit. Under the current system, for example, a Joint Task Force commander for disaster relief might not be eligible for joint duty credit, while a staff officer serving in a COCOM headquarters would be. The Department will propose revisions that broaden the types of activity for which officers may receive joint credit to include operational and tactical-level experiences (including homeland defense missions) and other non-governmental experiences that are “joint” in nature.
- Modify the statutory requirements which prescribe a three-year duty length for all joint duty positions. The lack of flexibility in the current system effectively precludes some highly-qualified officers from competing for command positions in which they are needed. The Department will propose revisions to provide the Secretary with maximum flexibility to recognize intensity and duration of joint duty assignments with the intention of reducing friction with Service and individual officer developmental requirements and Defense Officer Personnel Management timelines.
- Remove the statutory provisions which require a 10-week, in-residence course, addressing 21 specific issues, to achieve Joint Profession Military Education II accreditation. These detailed requirements were enacted because the Department resisted the JPME requirement when Goldwater-Nichols was enacted almost 30 years ago, and are no longer needed. The Department seeks more flexible and tailorable delivery methods that will meet Phase II requirements in a manner consistent with JS/Combatant Command (COCOM) needs while maintaining academic rigor.
- Establish a dedicated program or fellowship experience to produce joint strategists who are well-credentialed, specifically trained, and operationally informed to take part in development, production, and implementation of national military strategy.

3. COMBATANT COMMANDS

Actions Recommended:

- Elevate Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) to a unified combatant command, with Title 10/Sec. 164 authorities to include: joint force provider, cyber capabilities advocacy, and theater security cooperation.
- Retain relationship between CYBERCOM and National Security Agency (NSA). Provide that any separation must be conditions-based, with consideration to: (1) separation of personnel and platforms; and (2) institution of mechanisms to ensure NSA continues to respond to COCOM operational requirements as a critical combat support enabler providing strategic and operational threat warning.

- Maintain current relationships between CYBERCOM and DoD/Service organizations in the near term; assess relationships between cyber organizations to achieve overall mission effectiveness as a follow-on task.
- Consider organizational and mission changes to rationalize cyber authorities, capabilities, personnel and resources. Examine these potential efficiencies to provide department-wide offset options for \$128M (150 billets) over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to make elevation of CYBERCOM resource-neutral.

Actions Not Recommended:

- Merger of EUCOM and AFRICOM. AFRICOM was established as a separate unified combatant command less than a decade ago because EUCOM did not have the capacity to address the wide array of military challenges emerging on the African continent. These capacity challenges have not gotten any easier (and in fact have grown more complex) with the increasing Russian threat in Europe and the continuing rise of terrorist threats across Africa.
- Merger of NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM. Central and South America have long felt neglected and ignored by the United States. The existence of SOUTHCOM is one of the few signals we have given that we care about the region. A merger of NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM would likely reduce U.S. resources and U.S. influence in the region even further.
- Merger of DLA and TRANSCOM. The Department has examined the functions of DLA and TRANSCOM and determined that there is minimal overlap between the two. A merger would risk loss of focus on essential missions and a reversal of the substantial process the Department has made over the last decade in improving the management of these two large businesses.

4. ACQUISITION AND REQUIREMENTS

- Ensure that the Service Chiefs are fully included in the acquisition process by: (1) requiring the Chiefs to advise the Milestone Decision Authority and concur in cost, schedule, technical feasibility, and performance trade-offs that have been made with regard to the program; and (2) including the Chiefs, or their representatives, on Defense Acquisition Boards for the programs of their services. The Service Chiefs will be responsible and accountable for trade-offs between cost, schedule, and performance throughout the life of an acquisition program.
- Evaluate the feasibility of conducting combined or joint reviews of Major Defense Acquisition Programs between the military services and OSD.
- Reduce Defense Acquisition Board membership. Current DAB membership includes approximately 35 principal members and advisors, each of whom is likely to feel empowered as a “gatekeeper” for acquisition decisions. The Department will consider combining organizations and realigning membership from individual organizations to

functional areas to reduce memberships in order to free up staff time and focus discussions on issues critical to program outcomes.

- Reduce Acquisition Documentation Touch Points. The current acquisition process includes 14 documents that must be coordinated by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD/AT&L) in cases where OUSD/AT&L is the Milestone Decision Authority. The Department will seek opportunities for pushing approval authority down to a lower level in cases where a program remains on course in order to eliminate redundant reviews and shorten review timelines.
- Streamline documentation and review processes and examine potential efficiencies from Big Data for acquisition efforts to more effectively address requirements for acquisition data at all levels of the organization.
- Identify core elements required for developing Capabilities-Based Assessments, including component-led Study Advisory Groups with external stakeholders, to bolster up front analytic rigor to decisions impacting materiel solutions.
- Conduct a review of human capital requirements needed to improve analytical expertise for the identification, assessment, and approval of requirements.