Yeske helped change what complying with zero trust means

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency developed a zero trust architecture that features five pillars.

The Defense Department’s zero trust architecture includes seven pillars.

The one the Department of Homeland Security is implementing takes the best of both architectures and adds a little more to the mix.

Don Yeske, who recently left federal service after serving for the last two-plus years as the director of national security in the cyber division at DHS, said the agency had to take a slightly different approach for several reasons.

“If you look at OMB [memo] M-22-09 it prescribes tasks. Those tasks are important, but that itself is not a zero trust strategy. Even if you do everything that M-22-09 told us to do — and by the way, those tasks were due at the beginning of this year — even if you did it all, that doesn’t mean, goal achieved. We’re done with zero trust. Move on to the next thing,” Yeske said during an “exit” interview on Ask the CIO. “What it means is you’re much better positioned now to do the hard things that you had to do and that we hadn’t even contemplated telling you to do yet. DHS, at the time that I left, was just publishing this really groundbreaking architecture that lays out what the hard parts actually are and begins to attack them. And frankly, it’s all about the data pillar.”

The data pillar of zero trust is among the toughest ones. Agencies have spent much of the past two years focused on other parts of the architecture, like improving their cybersecurity capabilities in the identity and network pillars.

Yeske, who now is a senior solutions architect federal at Virtru, said the data pillar challenge for DHS is even bigger because of the breadth and depth of its mission. He said between the Coast Guard, FEMA, Customs and Border Protection and CISA alone, there are multiple data sources, requirements and security rules.

“What’s different about it is we viewed the problem of zero trust as coming in broad phases. Phase one, where you’re just beginning to think about zero trust, and you’re just beginning to adjust your approach, is where you start to take on the idea that my network boundary can’t be my primary, let alone sole line of defense. I’ve got to start shrinking those boundaries around the things that I’m trying to protect,” he said. “I’ve got to start defending within my network architecture, not just from the outside, but start viewing the things that are happening within my network with suspicion. Those are all building on the core tenants of zero trust.”

Capabilities instead of product focused

He said initial zero trust strategy stopped there, segmenting networks and protecting data at rest.

But to get to this point, he said agencies too often are focused on implementing specific products around identity or authentication and authorization processes.

“It’s a fact that zero trust is something you do. It’s not something you buy. In spite of that, federal architecture has this pervasive focus on product. So at DHS, the way we chose to describe zero trust capability was as a series of capabilities. We chose, without malice or forethought, to measure those capabilities at the organization, not at the system, not at the component, not as a function of design,” Yeske said. “Organizations have capabilities, and those capabilities are comprised of three big parts: People. Who’s responsible for the thing you’re describing within your organization? Process. How have you chosen to do the thing that you’re describing at your organization and products? What helps you do that?”

Yeske said the third part is technology, which, too often, is intertwined with the product part.

He said the DHS architecture moved away from focusing on product or technology, and instead tried to answer the simple, yet complex, questions: What’s more important right now? What are the things that I should spend my limited pool of dollars on?

“We built a prioritization mechanism, and we built it on the idea that each of those capabilities, once we understand their inherent relationships to one another, form a sort of Maslow’s hierarchy of zero trust. There are things that are more basic, that if you don’t do this, you really can’t do anything else, and there are things that are really advanced, that once you can do basically everything else you can contemplate doing this. And there are a lot of things in between,” he said. “We took those 46 capabilities based on their inherent logical relationships, and we came up with a prioritization scheme so that you could, if you’re an organization implementing zero trust, prioritize the products, process and technologies.”

Understanding cyber tool dependencies

DHS defined those 46 capabilities based on the organization’s ability to perform that function to protect its data, systems or network.

Yeske said, for example, with phishing-resistant, multi-factor authentication, DHS didn’t specify the technology or product needed, but just the end result of the ability to authenticate users using multiple factors that are resistant to phishing.

“We’re describing something your organization needs to be able to do because if you can’t do that, there are other things you need to do that you won’t be able to do. We just landed on 46, but that’s not actually all that weird. If you look at the Defense Department’s zero trust roadmap, it contains a similar number of things they describe as capability, which are somewhat different,” said Yeske, who spent more than 15 years working for the Navy and Marine Corps before coming to DHS. “We calculated a 92% overlap between the capabilities we described in our architecture and the ones DoD described. And the 8% difference is mainly because the DHS one is brand new. So just understanding that the definition of each of these capabilities also includes two types of relationships, a dependency, which is where you can’t have this capability unless you first had a different one.”

Yeske said before he left DHS in July, the zero trust architecture and framework had been approved for use and most of the components had a significant number of cyber capabilities in place.

He said the next step was assessing the maturity of those capabilities and figuring out how to move them forward.

If other agencies are interested in this approach, Yeske said the DHS architecture should be available for them to get a copy of.

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